In the twentieth century, Army operational logisticians sustained land combat operations in five recognized wars: World War I, World War II, Korea, Vietnam, and Operation Desert Storm. Only three of the five wars involved major combat maneuvers, namely World War II, Korea, and Operation Desert Storm. In each war, the logistics system had to be tailored in size, structure, and procedures to support the mission, composition, and concept of operations of the military forces. In World War II, the operational logistics system sustained the island hopping campaigns in the South Pacific and the Normandy invasion in Europe. In Korea, the operational logistics system sustained the Naktong (Pusan) Perimeter, the Inchon landing, and the ground offensive into North Korea. In Operation Desert Storm, the operational logistics system sustained the major ground offensive into Iraq. With the exception of Operation Desert Storm, the operational logistics system exhibited limitations. Lack of thorough planning in support of branches and sequels resulted in logistics culmination and operational logistics pauses in Operation Chromite (Korea) and Operation Overlord (World War II). US forces surrendered the initiative to the enemy and missed opportunities to quickly end the wars. According to James Huston, author of Logistics in Armed Conflict, logistics culmination and operational logistics pauses are a common event in the US war experience. One of the weaknesses of logistics has been a failure of transportation for the support of the exploitation and pursuit phases of an action. The purpose of the monograph is to determine whether continued ground operations would have shown Operation Desert Storm to be an example of a responsive Army theater logistic system for sustained land combat.