Coordination of design-for-recycling activities in decentralized product design processes in the automotive industry

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Coordination of design-for-recycling activities in decentralized product design processes in the automotive industry

Schmidt, Kerstin / Volling, Thomas / Spengler, Thomas S.

In this paper we presented a mathematical model for the analysis of decentralized design processes in the automotive industry and applied it to the case of the efficient compliance with recycling rates. We analyzed a centralized setting and compared the results to a decentralized setting with a fixed-price contract. The analysis showed that fixed-price contracts lead to inefficiencies. We then introduced the conceptual design of incentive contracts to make decentralized design processes in the automotive industry more flexible. Inefficiencies could be decreased by dividing the development risk between the OEM and his suppliers. Finally, we demonstrated the use of this concept based upon an illustrative example to show its applicability, Although the scope of the analysis lies on rather general characteristics, it captures the key elements of design processes in the automotive industry in both structural as well as logical respects. Our future research will concentrate on the mathematical analysis and evaluation of further contract types. This lays the basis for empirical testing using case study methodology. The vision is to support automotive companies in the design of efficient development contracts.