Public-private partnership (PPP) projects have been widely adopted in infrastructure construction. Owing to the professional operation capabilities of private investors, PPP also serves as an efficient tool to optimize the operational efficiency of infrastructures while alleviating the government’s financial pressure on the infrastructure provisions. Since the returns-chasing nature of private investors and information asymmetry lead to speculation, therefore government’s operation supervision is critical for PPP projects. Meanwhile, the irrational and inevitable emotions of the government and investors exert a significant influence on their operation and supervision behaviors. Based on the influence of emotion on the decision-making behaviors of investors and government, an evolutionary game model of PPP operation supervision is developed from the perspective of rank-dependent expected utility (RDEU) theory. Further, the effect of emotional factors on the choice of investors and government strategies are analyzed in the context of Nash equilibrium solutions under different emotional states; thereby, putting forward different suggestions for restraining the speculation of private investors. The study results indicate that the positive supervision strategy of severe punishment plays an imperative role in restraining investors’ speculation, whereas emotional factors exhibit a significant influence on the game equilibrium strategy related to the PPP project’s operation supervision. On the one hand, the probability of government authorities choosing an active supervision strategy becomes higher due to the increase in the emotion index; on the other hand, the probability of investors choosing active operation becomes higher due to the decrease in the emotion index. Thus, the government can reduce investors’ speculation through strict supervision and increasing the optimistic perception of investors.