The U.S. Air Force's new vision for the 21st century includes the doctrine of 'Global Engagement.' This doctrine consists of six core competencies: Air and Space Superiority, Global Attack, Rapid Global Mobility, Precision Engagement, Information Superiority, and Agile Combat Support. Each of these core competencies is in some way dependent on the Air Force's tanker fleet of KC-135s and KC-10s. Since the Air Force's reorganization in 1992, several key issues have transpired that affect the tanker fleet's ability to support these core competencies. First is the age and modernization of the KC- 135. Brought into the inventory in the late 1950s and early 1960s, this aircraft constitutes 90% of all aerial refueling aircraft. Although most have been re-engined, other modernization efforts have been postponed due to fiscal constraints. This forces the Air Force to rely on an airframe that barely keeps up with FAA regulations. Second, with the shift of scheduling responsibilities to Air Mobility Command, the tanker aircraft mission focus has shifted from one of aerial refueling to one that equates aerial refueling with airlift. This change in focus will no doubt reduce the active service life of the KC-135 and force earlier retirement and replacement of these aircraft. The peacetime scheduling of these assets through the Tactical Airlift Control Center (TACC) maximizes peacetime utilization, but instills a false sense of strategic lift capability when tanker assets are chopped to theater CINCs during contingency operations, thereby decreasing lift assets at the same airlift requirements increase. Finally, the reorganization that placed over 50% of the tanker assets in the Guard and Reserve serves the peacetime Air Force well. This may not be the case in a contingency should the National Command Authority delay a Guard/Reserve call-up decision. Ignoring these issues may have far-reaching ramifications during contingency operations now and in the 21st century.