Thesis: Although the future of the U. S. Navy's newly implemented 'Mine Warfare Campaign Plan' is promising, the Navy could not conduct a Wonsan type operation any better today than it did in 1950. Discussion: The amphibious operation at Wonsan Harbor North Korea was a mine warfare disaster for the U. S. Navy. For five days it delayed General MacArthur's ordered assault on Wonsan to cut off the enemy retreat north and to open a second supply line to relieve the overstressed port of Inchon. Additionally, it resulted in four minesweeper's sunk and numerous personnel casualties. The Navy has directly and indirectly taken many of the lessons from Wonsan and incorporated them into its new 'Mine Warfare Campaign Plan' for the 21st Century. Upon comparison with the Commander in Chief Pacific Fleet's now declassified 1950 evaluation of Wonsan and the 'Mine Warfare Campaign Plan,' today's Navy is still lacking in three important areas of mine warfare: logistics, officer experience, and quantity of forces. Like Wonsan, the Navy would quickly use up available spare parts in a large amphibious operation. Similarly, the Navy officer corps is not sufficiently schooled in mine warfare, which led to many of the staff planning problems at Wonsan. Finally, the quantity of mine forces today is not sufficient to conduct a Wonsan type operation. Conclusion: The Navy's plan to overcome the mine warfare challenges of a large amphibious assault, like Wonsan, are on the right track; however, it will take until the year 2010 to fully implement. In the meantime, it does not have the ability to conduct an amphibious assault in the face of mines, and will have to remain focused on achieving the ultimate readiness goal by 2010.