Analysis of NASA's Post-Challenger Response and Relationship to the Columbia Accident and Investigation
Analysis of NASA's Post-Challenger Response and Relationship to the Columbia Accident and Investigation
- New search for: R. G. Gregory
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- New search for: R. G. Gregory
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The investigatory findings of the Space Shuttle 'Challenger' and 'Columbia' accident investigation boards are analyzed and evaluated relative to one another, with the goal of determining if there are lessons applicable to organizations that manage technically complex programs. An analysis is conducted of the recommendations from the 'Challenger' investigation and NASA's actions taken to correct problems within the organization. The effectiveness of both the recommendations and NASA's response in terms of preventing the 'Columbia' accident are then examined. In the intervening years between the 'Challenger' and 'Columbia,' several unofficial analyses of the 'Challenger' accident and investigation were published. The findings of these independent works are presented to determine if they have any relationship to the 'Columbia' accident and subsequent 'Columbia' investigation. The investigations of the 'Columbia' and 'Challenger' accidents are compared to determine if any of the investigatory findings indicate that there were common factors in the accidents. An evaluation of NASA's organizational structure and culture, and their impact on the implementation of changes recommended after 'Challenger' also is examined. This analysis results in several conclusions and recommendations applicable to organizations that manage technically complex programs.
Document information
Analysis of NASA's Post-Challenger Response and Relationship to the Columbia Accident and Investigation
2006
143 pages
Report
No indication
English
Management Practice , Psychology , Public Health & Industrial Medicine , Job Environment , Manned Spacecraft , Group dynamics , Space shuttles , Accidents , Accident investigations , Culture , Risk management , Systems engineering , United states government , Safety , Prevention , Cohesion , Commonality , Organization theory , Space missions , Hierarchies , Response , Theses , Organizations , Nasa(National aeronautics and space administration) , Challenger shuttle , Columbia shuttle , Normalization of deviance , Assumption of risk , Groupthink , Organizational culture , Nasa culture , Accident investigation boards , Rogers commission , Diane vaughan , Irving janis , Safety programs , Cultural factors , Organizational factors , Hierarchical bureaucracies , Recommendations