Abstract With an increasing number of platform retailers introducing e-commerce brands (EBs), national brands (NBs) manufacturers choose to open self-operating channels as anti-entry tools for fighting against EB introduction. Motivated by this observation, we investigate the interaction and timing of firms’ e-commerce brand introduction and self-operating channel opening in a coopetitive supply chain with a platform retailer and an NB manufacturer, who is the platform retailer’s upstream cooperator and downstream competitor. Using game theory, we give and analyze the equilibrium results of six different scenarios, which characterize the platform retailer’s strategies about whether and which quality of EB should be introduced and the manufacturer’s strategies about whether to open the self-operating channel. Our results show that when the platform retailer is a first-mover, his optimal EB introduction strategy depends on the platform fee, consumers’ self-operating channel preferences, the NB’s quality, and the manufacturer’s self-operating strategy. When the manufacturer is a first-mover, the platform retailer is best to introduce a higher-quality EB irrespective of the manufacturer’s self-operating strategy. Furthermore, the manufacturer prefers the platform retailer to concentrate on her NB’s sale rather than introduce an EB in most cases, and the self-operating channel as an anti-entry approach to the platform retailer’s EB introduction is effective in some scenarios.

Highlights • Online retail platform is best to introduce high-quality E-commerce brand in most cases. • Self-operating channel is effective to deter E-commerce brand in some cases. • The timing of E-commerce brand introduction affects channel members’ price and strategy decisions.