There was no shortage of controversy about strategic sealift during the post-Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm evaluations. The Ready Reserve was not prepared. The Fast Sealift Ships inventory was insufficient. Commercial shipping in the United States was not the prominent industry it had been in years past. Lift requirements would not have been met without chartering both U.S. and foreign flagged vessels. Given the preponderance of criticism it is worth asking if it was justified, were any lessons learned from it, and if so, is the United States Navy on the right track to correct the problems and set up structures that will prevent them from reoccurring.
Strategic Sealift; Did Desert Storm Belie the Criticisms
1998
33 pages
Report
Keine Angabe
Englisch
Marine Engineering , Military Operations, Strategy, & Tactics , Military operations , Military reserves , Marine transportation , Iraq , Kuwait , Military requirements , Military strategy , Ships , United states , Lessons learned , Navy , Naval operations , Merchant vessels , Operation desert storm , Operation desert shield
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