In 2010, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) established the Commercial Crew Program (CCP) in order to provide human access to the International Space Station and low Earth orbit via the commercial (non-governmental) sector. A particular challenge to NASA has been how to determine that the Commercial Provider's transportation system complies with programmatic safety requirements. The process used in this determination is the Safety Technical Review Board which reviews and approves provider submitted hazard reports. One significant product of the review is a set of hazard control verifications. In past NASA programs, 100% of these safety critical verifications were typically confirmed by NASA. The traditional Safety and Mission Assurance (S&MA) model does not support the nature of the CCP. To that end, NASA S&MA is implementing a Risk Based Assurance process to determine which hazard control verifications require NASA authentication. Additionally, a Shared Assurance Model is also being developed to efficiently use the available resources to execute the verifications.


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    Titel :

    The Evolution of the NASA Commercial Crew Program Mission Assurance Process


    Beteiligte:

    Kongress:

    IAASS Conference 2016 - Safety First, Safety for All ; 2016 ; Melbourne, FL, United States


    Erscheinungsdatum :

    2016-05-18


    Medientyp :

    Aufsatz (Konferenz)


    Format :

    Keine Angabe


    Sprache :

    Englisch