In n 1954, the noted political scientist Samuel P. Huntington published a seminal article entitled 'National Policy and the Transoceanic Navy.' In it he sought to articulate the connection between the geopolitical conditions of the time and the need for and functions of the U.S. Navy. Huntington felt impelled to write because the Navy of 1954 was facing a quandary arising from its own success in World War II. The service faced similar quandaries in 1979, in the post-Vietnam national 'malaise' of the late 1970s; in 1992, in the wake of the Cold War; and again in 2004-2006, as major operations in Afghanistan and Iraq devolved into extended insurgencies. In each case the Navy had to reassess its purpose and missions and articulate a 'strategic concept.' In 2013 another quandary is forming, this time in an era of economic downturn, emerging peer competition, massive government debt, ballooning cost of all things needed to maintain a navy, and a world of bewildering complexity and change. The Navy's existing strategic concept, codified in 'A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower,' is barely six years old, but the issues just mentioned have arisen or intensified since that concept was crafted. The Navy faces, as it has in the past, an era of austerity following a period of extensive use and generous budgets, and once again a fundamental reassessment of its purpose is in order, as well as the articulation of a new strategic concept. This process is made all the harder by the ambiguous vector of geopolitical conditions. This article will attempt to establish a basis for such a reassessment and provide a vocabulary that could be useful in crafting a new strategic concept.