On 27 December 1979, Soviet forces invaded Afghanistan. What the Soviets envisioned as a short-term operation evolved into 9 years of conflict. For the Soviets, the end came with their withdrawal in 1989. Their poor performance in this low intensity conflict has received much attention recently, and offers much for study by military tacticians. However, the material available for study by logisticians is not as prolific. This paper attempts to correct this shortcoming by condensing those articles and books addressing Soviet logistics in the Afghanistan War into one document, and then presenting some conclusions about Soviet logistics doctrine and performance. The approach taken in this paper is to present the reader with the logistics infrastructure and environment that the Soviets faced in Afghanistan, moving then to the logistics doctrine of the Soviet Army, and contrasting this stated doctrine with how logistics actually worked during the course of the conflict. The paper ends with some conclusions about Soviet logistics in light of this experience. The logistics operations of supply, transportation, and maintenance are the cornerstones of this paper.
Soviet Logistics in the Afghanistan War
1991
31 pages
Report
Keine Angabe
Englisch
Logistics Military Facilities & Supplies , Military Operations, Strategy, & Tactics , Military forces(Foreign) , Addressing , Afghanistan , Army , Books , Doctrine , Logistics , Low intensity conflict , Military doctrine , Operation , Paper , Short range(Time) , USSR , Warfare , Logistics support , Military operations
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