Abstract Considering the disruption risk and congestion deterioration caused by recurrent outbreaks of COVID-19 in several ports, this study developed a port capacity decision three-stage game model by adopting a sharing approach, which comprised a combined port management committee and a two-port system. The former determines the capacity-sharing rate, and the latter sequentially chooses its terminal handling charge (THC). Through backward induction, the capacity-sharing decisions among multiple extrema are derived, and then the “siphon effect” and “spillover effect” of capacity-sharing are analyzed. A case study of Shanghai and Ningbo Zhoushan Ports is presented to further illustrate the findings.
Highlights Three-stage game model is developed by first adopting a capacity sharing approach in the post-COVID-19 pandemic era. The three-stage game model focuses on the imbalanced capacity and congestion deterioration. A combined port management committee and a two-port system are considered. The optimal capacity-sharing decisions among multiple extremums are derived. “Siphon effect” and “spillover effect” of capacity-sharing are comparatively analyzed.
Port capacity-sharing decisions in the post-COVID-19 pandemic era
Transport Policy ; 147 ; 22-31
2023-09-21
10 pages
Aufsatz (Zeitschrift)
Elektronische Ressource
Englisch
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