On November 2, 2013, two Russian Tupolev airplanes, including the world’s fastest nuclear bomber, entered Colombia’s national air space with no previous authorization. The interception process and the decisions made on a strategic level have left us, following Colin S. Gray’s theory, with some issues to reflect and some lessons that we must learn for Colombia to evolve in its decision-making process, and also for us to remember the importance of strategy in the use of air power. Specifically, the lessons de- rived from this experience allow Colombia to reflect on how to approach a situation of asymmetrical disadvantage when facing its enemies. It also forces us to recognize that military decisions are not the only deciding factors of strategy; instead, political will, the nation’s commitment and awareness of the country’s defense also have a role to play.
La interceptación de los Tupolev: enseñanzas desde la doctrina y la estrategia
2019
Aufsatz (Zeitschrift)
Elektronische Ressource
Unbekannt
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